Abstract-We consider problems of authentication using secret key generation under a privacy constraint on the enrolled source data. An adversary who has access to the stored description and correlated side information tries to deceive the authentication as well as learn about the source. We characterize the optimal tradeoff between the compression rate of the stored description, the leakage rate of the source data, and the exponent of the adversary's maximum false acceptance probability. The related problem of secret key generation with a privacy constraint is also studied where the optimal tradeoff between the compression rate, leakage rate, and secret key rate is characterized. It reveals a connection between the optimal secret key rate and security of the authentication system.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of authentication based on secret key generation. In the enrollment stage, a user provides the source sequence X n to the system. The source is compressed into a description M which is stored as a helping message. Meanwhile, the secret key message S is generated based on the source and will be used as a reference for authentication. In the authentication stage, the user provides an authentication sequence Y n which could be a noisy measurement of the enrolled source sequence. Based on M and Y n , the secret key is estimated asŜ and compared with the reference S. The user is successfully authenticated ifŜ = S.
The system described above can be relevant in several applications including those involving access control, secure, and trustworthy communication. One important class of potential applications is related to using biometric data such as fingerprint, iris scans, and DNA sequences for authentication (see, e.g., [1] and references therein). Unlike passwords, the biometric data inherently belong to users and provide a convenient and seemingly more secure way for authentication. However, it is crucial that privacy of the enrolled data must be protected from any inference of an adversary. The privacy risk in this case is of potentially high impact since the biometric data is commonly tied to the person identity. If it is compromised, it cannot be reverted or changed like in the case of using passwords.
In this work, we consider the secret-key based authentication problem in the presence of an adversary, who has access to the stored description M as well as correlated side information Z n , as shown in Fig. 1 . The adversary tries to deceive the authentication using its own sequenceỹ n and is also interested in learning about the enrolled source data X n . We call the event where the legitimate user fails during the authentication as a false rejection, and the event where the system accepts the adversary as a false acceptance. As for the privacy constraint, normalized mutual information between the enrolled source data X n and all information available at the adversary, e.g., (M, Z n ), is used as a measure of information leakage rate. We wish to design an authentication system that achieves negligible false rejection probability and at the same time minimizes 1) the compression rate of the stored description, 2) the leakage rate of the enrolled source, and 3) the maximum false acceptance probability (mFAP) exponentially. In general, there exists a tradeoff between the compression rate, the information leakage rate, and the mFAP exponent. For example, to obtain a large mFAP exponent while achieving reliable authentication for the legitimate user, a "high quality" description M may need to be stored which in turn can lead to high amount of information leakage. The main result of this work is a single-letter characterization of the fundamental tradeoff between the compression rate, information leakage rate, and mFAP exponent for discrete memoryless sources.
Closely related to the setting described above, we consider also the problem of secret key generation (for authentication) with a privacy constraint where, apart from reliable reconstruction of the secret key, we wish to maximize the secret key rate as well as ensuring that the leakage rate of the key is negligible. Also in this case, the optimal tradeoff between the compression rate, leakage rate of the source, and secret key rate is characterized. In particular, the optimal secret key rate is shown to be equivalent to the optimal mFAP exponent derived in the first problem.
Related Work
Authentication problems from an information theoretic perspective have been studied in several directions. Maurer in [2] considered the message authentication problem in connection with the hypothesis testing problem where the underlying message probability distributions of the legitimate user and adversary are assumed to be different. Martinian et al. [3] considered authentication with a distortion criteria. More recently, works appear to consider authentication problems based on secret key generation [4] . These include for example works [5] , [6] , [7] which focused on biometric authentication systems where privacy of the enrolled data is also taken into account. Analysis of deception probability in the authentication system from an adversary's perspective was also considered in [8] . Closely related to the secret key-based authentication problem with privacy constraint are the problems of source coding with privacy constraint, e.g., [9] , [10] , where the goals are to reconstruct the source reliably while preserving the privacy of the source or the reconstruction sequences from any inference of an eavesdropper. In this work, we extend the problem in [6] to a more general case where the adversary has correlated side information. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization of the problem studied in [7] . Standard notations in [11] are used.
II. SECRET KEY-BASED AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM

A. Problem Formulation
Let us consider a secret key-based authentication system shown in Fig. 1 . Source and side information alphabets, X , Y, Z are assumed to be finite. Let (X n , Y n , Z n ) be nlength sequences which are i.i.d. according to P X,Y,Z .
In the enrollment stage, based on the user's source sequence X n , an "encoder" generates a rate-limited description M ∈ M (n) and a secret key message S ∈ S (n) . For authentication, the user provides a (noisy) authentication sequence Y n to the system. Based on Y n and the stored description M , a "decoder" generatesŜ as an estimate of the secret key. The user will be positively authenticated ifŜ = S.
The information leakage rate at the adversary who has access to the stored description M and side information Z n , correlated with X n , is measured by the normalized mutual information I(X n ; M, Z n )/n. The adversary, based on M and Z n , also chooses a sequenceỹ n (M, Z n ) ∈ Y n for authentication. The maximum false acceptance probability (mFAP) is defined as mFAP maxỹn (M,Z n )∈Y n Pr(Sỹn = S), wherẽ Sỹn is the estimate resulting from M andỹ n . We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff between the compression rate, information leakage rate, and mFAP exponent.
Definition 1: A code for secret key-based authentication with a privacy constraint consists of
where M (n) and S (n) are finite sets. Definition 2: A compression-leakage-mFAP exponent tuple (R, L, E) ∈ R 3 + is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n there exists a code above such that
and
The compression-leakage-mFAP exponent region R 1 is the set of all achievable tuples.
B. Result
Theorem 1: The compression-leakage-mFAP exponent region R 1 for the problem depicted in Fig. 1 is given by 
for some joint distributions of the form P X,Y,Z P V |X P U|V with
Remark 1 (Randomized encoder): Theorem 1 holds also for a more general setting which allows randomized encoders, i.e., M and S are randomly generated according to p(m|x n ) and p(s|x n ), respectively. This can be seen from the converse proof of Theorem 1 that no assumption regarding the deterministic encoders was made.
Remark 2 (Special cases): i) When side information at the adversary is degraded, i.e., X − Y − Z forms a Markov chain, the compression-leakagemFAP exponent region is reduced to the set
for some joint distributions of the form P X,Y P Z|Y P V |X . We obtain this region from R 1 by setting U constant. The converse proof is modified slightly and is provided in the extended version [12] .
ii) When the adversary has no side information, the result in Theorem 1 reduces to that in [6] . For example, by setting Z and U equal to constants and R = H(X), we recover [6, Theorem 4] .
Proof of Theorem 1: The sketch of achievability proof is given below based on a random coding argument where we use the definitions and properties of ǫ-typicality as in [11] . Our achievable scheme utilizes layered coding and binning, while the converse proof for the information leakage rate is inspired by that of the secure source coding problem [9] .
Achievability: Fix P V |X and P U|V . Let ǫ and δ ǫ be positive real numbers where δ ǫ → 0 as ǫ → 0. 2) Enrollment: Given x n , the encoder looks for u n (j) and v n (j, k) that are jointly typical with x n . From the covering lemma [11] , with high probability, there exist such codeword pairs. If there are more than one pairs, the encoder selects one of them uniformly at random, and then sends the corresponding bin indices m 1 and m 2 to the decoder. The total rate is thus equal to I(X; U |Y )+I(X; V |U, Y )+5δ ǫ = I(X; V |Y )+5δ ǫ . The secret key is set to be the subbin index s in which the chosen sequence v n ∈ b V (j, m 2 ) falls. 3) Authentication: The decoder looks for u n (j) and v n (j, k) in the bins (m 1 , m 2 ) which are jointly typical with y n . From the packing lemma [11] , with high probability, it will find the unique sequence u n (j) ∈ b U (m 1 ) which is jointly typical with y n . Then, with high probability, it will find the unique
which is jointly typical with y n and the decoded u n (j). Finally, it puts out the corresponding subbin index of the decoded v n as an estimate of the secret key which, with high probability, will be equal to the generated one.
Let U n (J) and V n (J, K) be the codewords chosen at the encoder in the enrollment stage, and (M 1 , M 2 ) be the corresponding indices of the bins to which U n (J) and V n (J, K) belong. Note that (M 1 , M 2 ) can be determined from (J, K).
From the enrollment stage, the sources and selected codewords are jointly typical, i.e.,
, with high probability. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The following bound holds, H(Z n |J) ≤ n(H(Z|U ) + δ ǫ ).
Proof: The proof is given in [12] . Then, the information leakage averaged over all possible codebooks can be bounded as follows. As for an achievable mFAP exponent, we consider the adversary who knows m = (m 1 , m 2 ) and side information z n and tries to select a sequenceỹ n (m, z n ) that results in the estimated keySỹn equal to the original key S of the person it claims to be. From our achievable scheme, the secret key S is chosen from the subbin index of the selected codeword V n . Thus, the adversary only needs to considerSỹn that results from sequences V n which are jointly typical with X n . There are in total 2 n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ) such sequences generated. Similarly as in [6] , from the binning scheme with uniform bin and subbin index assignment, we have that the joint probability that a description m is selected and a certain secret key s is chosen is equal to a total number of jointly typical sequences v n with corresponding indices m and s divided by a total number of jointly typical sequences v n . That is,
Let g(·) denote the decoding function used for estimating the secret key message in the achievability scheme. Then mFAP = max
where (a) follows from the uniform bin and subbin index assignment in the achievable scheme and the bound in (8), (b) follows from the code construction where |S| = 2 n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δǫ) and |M| = |M 1 ||M 2 | = 2 n(I(X;V |Y )+5δǫ) , and (c) follows from the Markov chain
That is, we have
is independent of V i given X i due to the memoryless property of the side information channel P Y,Z|X . For any achievable tuple (R, L, E) ∈ R 3 + , it follows that
where (a) follows from Fano's inequality H(S|M, Y n ) ≤ nǫ n and (b) follows from the definition of V i and that conditioning reduces entropy.
The information leakage can be bounded as follows.
where (a) follows from Fano's inequality, (b) follows from the Markov chains
, (c) follows from the Csiszár's sum identity [13] ,
follows from the definitions of U i and V i and the Markov chain
Lastly, the bound on mFAP exponent
can be shown similarly as in [6] with some modification. This part of the proof is provided in the extended version [12] . The proof ends with the standard steps for single letterization using a time-sharing random variable and letting δ n , ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞. The cardinality bounds on the sets U and V can be proved using the support lemma [13] , and is provided in [12] . 
C. Binary Example
To demonstrate the derived tradeoff, let us consider a simple binary example of the special case in Remark 2i). Let X ∼ Bern(1/2), Y is an erased version of X with erasure probability p, and Z is an erased version of Y with erasure probability q. The region R 1,X−Y −Z in Remark 2i) reduces to the set of all (R, L, E) such that
for some α ∈ [0, 1/2]. The proof is given in [12] . We can see for example that there is a tradeoff between the mFAP exponent and the leakage rate, i.e., in order to increase the mFAP exponent, we need to allow some more leakage.
III. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH PRIVACY CONSTRAINT
In this section, we consider a related problem setting depicted in Fig. 2 where, instead of maximizing the mFAP exponent, we are interested in maximizing the secret key rate generated at the enrollment stage as well as protecting the secret key from any inference of an adversary who has access to the description M and side information Z n . This setting without the compression rate constraint was studied in [7] where the authors characterized inner and outer bounds to the leakage-key rate region. Moreover, it is closely related to the one-way secret key generation with rate constraint in [14] .
A. Problem Formulation
The problem setting follows similarly as that in Section II-A, except that the mFAP constraint in (4) is replaced by the key rate and key leakage constraints.
Definition 3: A tuple (R, L, R s ) ∈ R 3 + is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n there exists a code consisting of encoders and a decoder (as in Definition 1) such that (1)-(3) hold and 1 n H(S) ≥ R s − δ,
1 n I(S; M, Z n ) ≤ δ.
The compression-leakage-key rate region R 2 is the set of all achievable tuples.
